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INTRODUCTION
Informed consent is a common law concept rooted in the idea that
"[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to de-
termine what shall be done with his own body."' Its aim is to ensure that
each patient gets the information she needs to meaningfully consent to
medical procedures.2 Coming of age in the 1970s alongside other im-
portant rights movements, informed consent purported to solve
medicine's paternalism: doctors too often dictating treatments rather
than discussing options. Combating medical paternalism seems a
• J.D. 2007, University of Michigan Law School. Thank you to Professor Carl Schnei-
der for helping me develop this topic and for his valuable insight along the way. Also,
thank you to Professor Rachel Croskery-Roberts for her thoughts and time. And
thank you to my wonderful friend and colleague Haley Krug for her generous giving
of time and support. My deepest appreciation to the staff of the Michigan Journal of
Gender &Law for their help and for giving me this opportunity.
1. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (1972) (citing Schloendorff v. Soc'y of
N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)). For a discussion of the disclosures a phy-
sician is required to make in order to enable the patient to make an informed consent
see 70 C.J.S. Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Health-Care Providers 5 120 (2006).
2. CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 8 (1998).
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worthwhile goal, given abuses in the past century,3 but moreover to
improve everyday physician-patient encounters. Nevertheless, a lofty
goal does not dictate a positive outcome, and some decades later, the law
of informed consent is failing.'
Breast cancer is an excellent example of the bases for informed con-
sent requirements because it is a medical condition where the treatment
options have similar medical outcomes but distinctly different non-
outcome related traits that will influence the patient's preferences as an
individual. Today, when diagnosed with early onset breast cancer, a
woman will often face a choice between lumpectomy, known as breast-
conserving surgery (BCS), and mastectomy.' Informed consent is not
about the answer the patient comes to, but about protecting her right to
come to a decision after having been duly informed of treatment options
and associated risks. Breast cancer patients must weigh their own prefer-
ences and values in order to make the best personal decision. Medical
research has yielded conclusive results showing that when faced with
early stage breast cancer, a woman's survival rate is the same whether she
undergoes mastectomy or BCS.6 The pros and cons of each treatment
3. See Charity Scott, Why Law Pervades Medicine: An Essay On Ethics In Health Care, 14
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 245, 249 (2000) (discussing the history of
informed consent, including historical catalysts such as the Tuskegee Syphilis Study).
4. Eg. Carl E. Schneider, Some Realism About Informed Consent, 145 J. LABORATORY &
CLINICAL MED. 289, 289-91 (2005).
5. Susan G. Nayfield et. al., Statutory Requirements for Disclosure of Breast Cancer Treat-
ment Alternatives, 86 J NAT'L CANCER INST. 1202 (1994). "[B]reast-conserving
surgery with postoperative radio-therapy has been recognized as equivalent in medical
outcome to that achieved with mastectomy for early-stage disease." Id. at 1204. I will
refer to simple mastectomy as mastectomy. This is in contrast to radical mastectomy,
discussed in Part I. Though radical mastectomy may still be used in certain cases, the
salient decision for the discussion herein is between simple mastectomy and BCS, as
breast cancer informed consent statutes are aimed at women faced with this choice.
BARRON H. LERNER, The BREAST CANCER WARS 232-3 (2001).
6. See, e.g., Steven J. Katz et al., Patient Involvement in Surgery Treatment Decisions for
Breast Cancer, 23 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 5526, 5526 (2005) ("[T]here is profes-
sional consensus that most women with early-stage breast cancer are good candidates
for breast-conserving surgery .... "); Ann B. Nattinger, Variation in the Choice of
Breast Conserving Surgery or Mastectomy: Patient or Physician Decision Making?, 23 J.
CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 5429, 5429 (2005) ("In 1985, the 5-year results were published
of the first US randomized trial ... demonstrating equal survival for early-stage breast
cancer patients whether they underwent mastectomy or breast-conserving surgery
(BCS).") (citing Bernard Fisher et al., Five-year Results of a Randomized Clinical Trial
Comparing Total Mastectomy and Segmental Mastectomy With or Without Radiation in
the Treatment of Breast Cancer, 312 NEw ENG. J. MED. 665 (1985)).
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choice are very distinct, while survival rates, in many cases, are compa-
rable.7
In an ostensible effort to ensure that breast cancer patients are able
to make good treatment decisions, twenty-two states have enacted stat-
utes that add a legislative component to the existing protection of the
common law informed consent doctrine for patients diagnosed with
breast cancer and faced with treatment options." Promulgated at the be-
hest of former breast cancer patients in the 1980s,9 they are benign
statutes on some levels. In general, they compel doctors to provide addi-
tional literature to breast cancer patients about treatment options,
including the surgical decision between mastectomy and BCS. °
Physicians, however, have expressed concerns regarding the negative
impact of such legislation on their ability to treat women." And, in spite
of their innocuous appearance, patients and lawyers have good reason to
be concerned about these statutes as well. These laws do not promote
individualistic decision-making. 12 In fact, they stem in part from the
assumption that individual women were making an "incorrect" decision
when they chose mastectomy instead of lumpectomy. 3 This is not
7. Nananda F. Col, Christine Duffy & Carol Landau, Commentary-Surgical Decisions
after Breast Cancer: Can Patients Be Too Involved in Decision Making?, 40 HEALTH
SERVICES Ras. 769 (2005) ("Deciding whether to undergo breast conserving therapy
(BCT) or mastectomy remains difficult for women diagnosed with early stage breast
cancer. Despite the substantial differences in the side effects of these treatments, no
survival differences have been shown up to 20 years later among women with stage I
and II cancer."). The choice between BCS and mastectomy is what is known as
"preference-sensitive care," which are "care situations in which there are two or more
treatment options that are medically justified, [and therefore] the decision process
should incorporate and be sensitive to patient preferences regarding the various
treatment options." Paula M. Lantz et al., Satisfaction with Surgery Outcomes and the
Decision Process in a Population-Based Sample of Women with Breast Cancer, 40
HEALTH SERVICES Ras. 745, 746 (2005) (citing J.E. Wennberg, Unwarranted Varia-
tions in Healthcare Delivery: Implications for Academic Medical Centres, 325 BRITISH
MED. J. 961, 961-64 (2002)).
8. Nayfield, supra note 5, at 1206. See infra text accompanying note 65 for list of stat-
utes.
9. Theresa Montini, Resist and Redirect: Physicians Respond to Breast Cancer Informed
Consent Legislation, 26 WOMEN & HEALTH 85, 86 (1997).
10. Nayfield, supra note 5. See infra Part III.
11. Nayfield, supra note 5, at 1206 ("The [Massachusetts] Medical Society launched an
attempt to repeal the statute ... citing the law's undue interference in the patient-
physician relationship and arguing that all treatment alternatives are not alike.").
12. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 9 (noting a number of legal scholars have strongly
critiqued the doctrine of informed consent, though these statutes specifically have not
been subject to any in depth legal scrutiny).
13. See infra Part II (discussing the historical context of breast cancer informed consent
statutes).
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merely the law overstepping its role by proffering medical advice, but
moreover it is a perversion of the goal of informed consent.
Breast cancer informed consent statutes exemplify the extent to
which the doctrine, when put into practice, has been perverted into a
morally coercive tool, instead of the individual-centered mantra of its
aspirations. These statutes are widely perceived as stemming from the
commonly held idea that mastectomy is "over-used" in the treatment of
breast cancer. 14 Not only does pushing patients toward a particular
course of treatment fly in the face of the goals of informed consent,
these laws are rooted in a time that has since passed: doctors are no
longer pushing mastectomy over BCS,"5 and today many patients de-
mand mastectomies based on their personal values and preferences."
Breast cancer informed consent legislation was introduced in re-
sponse to breast cancer patient discontent with doctor-patient
relationships.1 7 Physicians do not always believe that explaining treat-
ment alternatives is important, 8 and in this respect, legislation
promoting the discussion of alternative treatment could be positive for
breast cancer patients, many of whom do in fact have several viable
medical options. 9 Studies have found, however, that these statutes have
no lasting impact on patient decision-making.0 Why aren't these pa-
tient-driven statutes affecting patient decision-making? And why is
medical advice coming from the law at all?
This Article argues that this legislation is a poor tool for creating
positive change in the physician-patient realm of breast cancer treat-
21
ment. Ideally, informed consent for breast cancer patients would be an
individualistic process. It would be shaped by the specific context of the
patient's life, as well as the gender inequities that still pervade medicine.
The right kind of laws would see a "good" decision as one in which the
patient is left physically and emotionally satisfied. To the contrary, these
statutes imply that what women need is more naked information on
14. Paula M. Lantz et al., Satisfaction with Surgery Outcomes and the Decision Process in a
Population-Based Sample of Women with Breast Cancer, 40 HEALTH SERVICES RES.
745, 746-47 (2005) ("An explicit assumption in much ... policy development [in-
cluding breast cancer informed consent statutes] is that mastectomy is 'over-used.').
15. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
17. Theresa Montini, Gender and Emotion in the Advocacy for Breast Cancer Informed
Consent Legislation, 10 GENDER & SOC'Y 9, 13-14 (1996).
18. Nayfield, supra note 5, at 1206.
19. Id.
20. Nattinger, supra note 6.
21. This Article is limited in scope to addressing these specific statutes and, by extension,
breast cancer patients. I do not mean to suggest, nor does the data support, that
breast cancer patients are in any global sense "different" than other patient groups.
[Vol. 14:201
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treatment options, an idea divorced from what is known about patient
decision-making.
Part I of this Article provides social and historical context of the
breast cancer issue and argues that non-legal, largely social, forces are
responsible for positive changes in the physician-breast cancer patient
relationship. Part II contrasts the goals of informed consent to the reality
of its unsuccessful application. Part III examines the statutes themselves
and the mandatory literature that they have produced, arguing that
these statutes are unhelpful to breast cancer patients as well as to their
doctors.
I. BREAST CANCER HISTORY: SOCIAL AND MEDICAL EVOLUTION
The history of breast cancer in the United States demonstrates both
the heavy-handed medical approach to breast cancer treatment that pre-
vailed until the 1970s, and the surgical blindsiding of many women that
resulted. The story is richer than that, though. It shows adaptation and
movement within the medical field that is reactive to a changing land-
scape for women's rights and women's health issues.22 As pro-patient
doctors and activists emerged on the scene, the treatment of breast can-
cer improved-not only in terms of enhanced medical outcomes, but
also in terms of personal interactions and psychological coping with the
disease and treatment.
The socio-medical history of breast cancer is a tale not of law (in
the form of informed consent) driving pro-woman policy in medicine
and society, but of societal changes and medical evolution preceding
legal principles. Initially, there was a clear need for reform. Many sur-
geons' paternalism suppressed the voices and opinions of women during
the era of the radical mastectomy, which began at the turn of the eight-
eenth century and lasted until the 1970s."
However, the medical field itself, as evidenced by the work and no-
toriety of progressive physicians, was not without its own momentum
for reform during this time. Indeed, the consumer movement of the
1970s affected patient expectations of their doctors.24 And, not surpris-
ingly, the doctrine of informed consent made its way into state
22. Vicki Lawrence MacDougall, Medical Gender Bias and Managed Care, 27 OKLA. Crrv
U. L. REV. 781, 800-01 (2002) ("The Women's Health Movement [which] began
over thirty years ago . . . created public awareness and spurred the medical profession
toward this introspection.").
23. See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of radical
mastectomy and its implications.
24. Montini, supra note 17, at 14.
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legislation during this time.25 Women took action in the debate, encour-
aging all women to ask questions, to be heard, and to demand the
medical treatment that was right for them.
Before the legal adoption of informed consent, physician-patient
communication was lacking for the majority of breast cancer patients.
Deception was posed as a legitimate option for physicians-some practi-
tioners believed that withholding cancer diagnoses was benevolent and
even discussed the tactic in medical publications. 26 During the reign of
the radical mastectomy, many surgeons expressed the view that the
21breast was not of importance to women, especially older women.
Medical articles referred to the breast as a "nonvital and functionless
gland," "one of the most dispensable parts of the body," or "a superficial
easily disposable utilitarian appendage. ' 2' This attitude of expendability
of the breast contributed to the acceptance of the radical mastectomy.29
For almost a century, radical mastectomy reigned as the treatment
of choice for breast cancer. ° A radical mastectomy is a disfiguring opera-
tion, which leaves "women with a deformed chest wall, hollow areas
beneath the clavicle and the underarm, and, at times, persistent pain at
the operative site and swelling known as lymphedema."' 3 Besides being
extensive and painful procedures, they were also routinely done without
the patient's express consent. Often upon diagnosing a patient with
breast cancer during surgery, the surgeon would proceed with the radical
mastectomy right then and there, giving the operation the nickname of
the "one-step" procedure. 2
The law itself may have contributed to the persistence of the radical
mastectomy as the near lone treatment option because many surgeons
feared liability for performing what they viewed as less thorough proce-
dures. 3 Dr. Baron Lerner, a medical doctor and breast cancer historian,
states that "[firom a legal perspective, certain surgeons believed that re-
current breast cancer following a smaller procedure made them liable-
25. Id. at 9.
26. LERNER, supra note 5, at 88.
27. Id. at 89.
28. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
29. Id. at 88-89. For a related idea, see also Rebecca L. VanCourt, Comment, Uterine
Fibroids and Women's Right to Choose, 26 J. LEGAL MED. 507, 515 (2005) ("Some
gynecologists suggest 'the useless uterus' theory has lead to an increase in hysterec-
tomy procedures [in older women].").
30. LERNER, supra note 5, at 17-29. Dr. William Halsted is known as the father of the
radical mastectomy. Id. He was responsible for significant sanitation advances in sur-
gery; for example the use of rubber gloves to prevent infection. Id.
31. Id. at 32-33.
32. Id. at 28.
33. Id at 163.
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because they had both done an inadequate procedure and deviated from
standard surgical custom."" And many surgeons simply did not want
patients, particularly female patients, telling them what to do. 5 Some
doctors responded indignantly to breast cancer patients who "march[ed]
on clinics and private offices waving copies of McCall's, Good Housekeep-
ing, Ms., Playgirl, or the supplement of their local newspaper" and told
their doctors how they wished to be treated.36
In the later part of the twentieth century, doctors began dissenting
to the hegemony of the radical mastectomy, however. In the 1960s, Dr.
Barney Crile, famed surgeon and critic of the radical mastectomy, com-
piled substantial data on the outcomes of breast cancer patients who
received only simple mastectomies.37 The results were positive and pain-
ful side effects were reduced . Also during the 1960s, Dr. Vera Peters, a
Canadian physician, advocated in favor of a "breast conservation ther-
apy," which included a course of radiation, and gathered positive data in
support of this approach. 9 The perseverance of progressive individuals
like these within the medical field was ultimately an important part of
medicine's evolution in its treatment of breast cancer.
In addition to physicians such as Crile and Peters, breast cancer
survivors also played an important role in effecting change, especially by
articulating first-hand their personal experiences with radical mastec-
tomy.'° Many women spoke out about their discontent with the pain
and disfigurement of radical mastectomy, and some urged women to
endure the treatment, proudly declaring it as having rid them of can-
cer.41 For example, on the pro-radical mastectomy side, Terese Lasser, a
prominent New Yorker, received a one-step, radical mastectomy in
1952." Soon after her own surgery, Lasser founded the group Reach to
Recovery, which reached out to other women recovering from radical
mastectomies, giving them gifts of "falsies" and letters to their husbands
"urg[ing] men to make their wives feel sexually desirable."43
34. Id.
35. Id. at 164.
36. Id. (citation omitted).
37. Id. at 116-17.
38. Id. at 117. According to studies presented by Dr. Barney Crile, 80% of patients who
received a simple mastectomy survived for at least three years compared to 75% of
patients receiving radical mastectomy, and none of the patients that underwent radical
mastectomy developed lymphedema of the arm. Id.
39. Id. at 132-33.
40. Id. at 143-44.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 142-43.
43. Id. at 143.
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But a more common message on either side of the radical mastec-
tomy debate was the sense that women felt silenced and overridden by
the current state of breast cancer treatment. 4 Babette Rosmond, breast
cancer survivor and author, published The Invisible Worm in 1972 about
her experience with breast cancer and surgery.4' Rosmond, who was
treated by Dr. Crile, praised her doctor for communicating well with
her, which "spared her the 'severe trauma' of remaining uninformed.""
She believed that doctors who decided for instead of with their patients
were masking "arrogan[ce], prejudic[e], [and] disinterest[] in human
beings" with beneficence.4 ' The meaning of being left out, rather than
failing to be consulted, evoked the majority of disdain from many
women; the disrespect and disregard for women that necessarily under-
girded a practice such as the one-step procedure rightly drew harsh criti-
cism from breast cancer patients.
The fall of the radical mastectomy as the standard mode of treat-
ment for breast cancer coincided with an era of radical and progressive
changes in many aspects of society during the 1970s. Feminist voices,
while present throughout history, were more numerous and outspoken
than ever. One such feminist critic posed a provocative question regarding
radical mastectomies, asking: Should "amputation, mutilation, and maim-
ing and crippling of a woman's body be considered a cure?"49 Scientific
studies began to take the emotional and psychological ramifications of
breast cancer and its treatment more seriously.50 Many cancer memoirs,
such as The Invisible Worm, were published during this time, and women's
magazines, such as Ms. and McCalls, became lively forums for discussions
about breast cancer and its treatment." The need for reformation of the
breast cancer patient's role in medical decision-making was made clear by
the medical landscape during this time. In the years leading up to the
1980s, breast cancer treatment improved, and physicians became increas-
ingly sensitive to the needs of their female patients.
44. See, e.g., id. at 144-45. Breast cancer survivor T. Lasser, see supra notes 42-43, en-
couraged women to speak out about breast cancer and their recovery, whether
physicians wanted them to or not.
45. Id. at 151-52.
46. Id. at 154.
47. Id. (citing BABETrE CAMPION, THE INVISIBLE WORM (1972)). Babette Campion was
the penname of Babette Rosmond.
48. See id. at 223-40.
49. Id. at 9 (quoting DoRoTHY SHINDER, MAYHEM ON WOMEN 20 (1972)).
50. See id. at 145,
51. See id. at 158-61, 170-71.
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Legal reform, however, was not at the helm of this evolution. In-
stead, it was breast cancer advocates with their growing clout who
turned to the law as a tool for further progress, and they had great suc-
cess in passing informed consent statutes. The question now is: Why
didn't the legal reform efforts work for women? This Article argues
breast cancer informed consent statutes failed to properly address the
lack of communication between breast cancer patients and their doctors.
Instead, these laws gummed up the works even further by giving cookie-
cutter, often lackluster, medical advice to women who wanted, above all,
to be listened to and respected as individuals.
II. INFORMED CONSENT: GOALS & REALITY
Informed consent is a judicial doctrine meant to set standards for
physician disclosure to patients. Stated in general terms, the doctrine
holds that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a
,,52right to determine what shall be done with his own body .... A set
of disclosure standards has developed out of informed consent jurispru-
dence. Specifically, a physician "must inform the patient of the diagnosis
or nature of his or her ailment, as well as the general nature of, and the
",51purpose or reason for, the contemplated treatment or procedure ...
Additionally, and more salient to the statutes at hand, physicians must
inform patients of any alternatives to the proposed procedure and the
risks and benefits accompanying such alternatives.54
Inaccurate assumptions about the preferences and practices of pa-
tients underlie the doctrine of informed consent. Professor Carl
Schneider catalogues the assumptions underlying the doctrine of in-
formed consent as follows: (1) patients want to make their own medical
decisions, (2) patients want to receive relevant medical information, (3)
physicians are willing and able to convey all relevant information to
their patients, (4) patients will be able to understand and remember the
information given to them, and (5) patients must reason through medi-
cal issues well enough to satisfy standards they have for themselves; that
is, that patients are able to apply the information supplied." Laid out in
52. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (quoting Schloendorffv.
Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)).
53. 70 C.J.S. Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Health-Care Providers § 120 (2006) (inter-
nal citations omitted).
54. Koapke v. Herfendal, 660 N.W.2d 206, 212 (N.D. 2003).
55. Carl E. Schneider, AfterAutonomy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 411,417 (2006).
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this fashion, expecting all patients to meet these criteria is clearly unrea-
sonable,56 as documented by numerous studies.57
Many years after the doctrine of informed consent became a legal
fixture, studies indicate that law still does not understand what goes on
between doctors and patients.58 Studies on patient decision-making have
found that the process is often driven by knee-jerk reactions that are
backward rationalized, not determined by analytical weighing of hard
data.59 In fact, decisions may have more to do with presentation than
information, considering the inherent dependence of patients on doc-
tors.6° Moreover, the expectation that patients will be able to understand
the information presented to them is not a realistic one."' Such legisla-
tion also costs more time and money.62
Thus, the benefits of the common law informed consent regime do
not outweigh its costs. Informed consent is not only premised on unre-
alistic generalizations about patients, but moreover it has negative
impacts on both patients and physicians. And, as will be explored in
Part III, these laws do not help breast cancer patients make decisions
with which they are more satisfied.
III. INFORMED CONSENT AND THE LEGISLATION
THAT WORKS AGAINST IT
As discussed in Part I, informed consent's aspirations and its reality
in implementation stand in stark contrast. The breast cancer informed
consent statutes are but one example of this phenomenon. It is not sur-
56. Authors Karene and Eric Boos layout some of the many intangible values associated
with informed consent:
There is no more poignant example of the difficulties involved in legislat-
ing and enforcing a moral concept than the doctrine of informed consent
.... When dealing with fundamental epistemological distinctions (such as
the difference between appreciation and understanding, competence and
voluntariness, bodily integrity and self-determination, decisional authority
and autonomy) it is doubtful, in light of the relevant factors in each par-
ticular case, whether there can be any clear objective standards.
Karene Boos & Eric J. Boos, At the Intersection of Law and Morality: A Descriptive
Sociology of the Effectiveness of Informed Consent Law, 5 J.L. Soc'Y 457, 464
(2004).
57. Schneider, supra note 55, at 418-25.
58. Id. at417-26.
59. Id. at420-21.
60. Boos & Boos, supra note 56, at 466-67.
61. Schneider, supra note 55, at 418-25.
62. Id. at 436.
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prising that the authoritative tool that law is-a tool devised to organize
society according to dominant ideals and mores-is ill suited to improve
the intimate and even idiosyncratic realm of the physician-patient rela-
tionship.63 Legal informed consent sets standards for physician disclosure
that do not address the needs of patients because no patient is the ge-
neric ideal that the law has invented. 64
This section will first lay out the requirements of these statutes, and
explore some of the literature that has come out of them, focusing on
state-to-state variations. Next, it will offer some of the relevant socio-
medical research that has been done on patients and physicians, con-
trasting what these studies have found with the content of the statutes.
Finally, drawing on the discussion from all parts of the Article, it will
conclude with a vision of what women may actually want during the
process of choosing a breast cancer treatment, arguing in part that these
laws may have a detrimental effect on breast cancer patients who wish to
have, and would be satisfied with, mastectomy instead of BCS.
A. Breast Cancer Informed Consent Statutes:
Content and State-to-State Variability
Breast cancer informed consent statutes are prevalent throughout
the country. Twenty-two states have enacted informed consent legisla-
tion regarding breast cancer treatment options.65 While the statutes
impact a great number of women facing breast cancer treatment, the
parameters of this impact will vary greatly depending on the state. The
breast cancer informed consent statutes mandate that certain informa-
63. See Scott, supra note 3.
64. See infa Part III.C.
65. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 109277 (2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 458.324,
459.0125 (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-34-21 (2005); HAw. REV. STAT. § 671-3
(1993 & Supp. 2006); 20 ILCS 2310/2310-345 (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-
2836(M) (2002); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.935 (2007); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 40:1300.151 TO .154 (2001); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. TIT. 24, § 2905-A (2000);
MD. ANN. CODE, HEALTH-GEN. § 20-113 (LexisNexis 2005); MD. ANN. CODE.,
HEALTH Occ. § 14-404 (LexisNexis 2005); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. CH. 111
§ 70E(H) (2006); MICH. COMp. LAws § 333.17013-17513 (2001); MINN. STAT.
§ 144.651(9) (2006); Mo. REv. STAT. § 376.1250 (2007); Motrt. CODE ANN. § 37-
3-333 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2-168, 45:9-22.3a, .3b; N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAw §§ 2404-2409 (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2007); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 5641-5642 (West 2007); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 86.001-005,
.011-012 (Vernon 2001 & Supp. 2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2971 (2005), W.
VA. CODE § 16-33-1 TO -12 (LexisNexis 2006). See National Cancer Institute, State
Cancer Legislative Database Program, http://www.scld-nci.net/index.cfml (last visited
Oct. 26, 2007), for a helpful database, using "Search Database" function.
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tion be given to a breast cancer patient who is considering her treatment
options. Compliance most often comes in the form of a booklet or
pamphlet.66 Variability exists in the content of information, the breadth
and depth of information given, the existence of a private cause of ac-
tion for noncompliance with the statutes, and in the tone of literature
with respect to the patient's duty to make a decision for herself.
The statutes have been enacted during the past thirty years, with
the first enactment in Massachusetts in 1979.67 The bulk of such legisla-
tion was passed during the early 1980s, 6s which is expected given the
social climate brought about by the consumer movement. 69 The major-
ity of the statutes define valid informed consent for breast cancer
treatment via regulatory literature, while a minority only address the
issue of informed consent without forcing doctors to provide particular
documents to their patients.7 °
The various forms of literature that came out of the statutes con-
tain markedly different medical information regarding surgical
treatment options. For example, while some statutes emphasize BCS as a
viable treatment option, others lack up to date information on BCS.71
Only five of the summaries state explicitly that BCS may not be a viable
option for all patients. As to information outside of surgical treat-
ments, the writings vary greatly in the amount of detail given to breast
reconstruction surgery,73 a topic that may be of great importance to
some patients.
Several other aspects to the mandated information vary greatly
from state to state. Several statutes provide a private cause of action for
physician noncompliance. 74 For example, both Kansas and Maryland
66. Nayfield, supra note 5, at 1203-04. (noting that in twelve states, standardized written
information in the form of booklets or brochures is required).
67. Legislative Data Byte: States with Laws Addressing the Disclosure of Breast Cancer
Treatment Options and/or Informed Consent (as of June, 30 1999), ST. CANCER
LEGIS. DATABASE UPDATE (Nat'l Cancer Inst., Bethestda, Md.), July 1999, at 23,
available at http://www.scld-nci.net/updates/pdf/SCLD%/o20Update799.pdf.
68. Id.; Montini II, supra note 17, at 9. Twenty-two such statutes were introduced dur-
ing this decade. Id. Fifteen of the sixteen that were passed were enacted between 1979
and 1986. Id. at 10 tbl. 1.
69. Montini, supra note 9, at 90 (discussing the convergence of the women's movement
and consumer movement of the 1970s as an impetus for breast cancer informed con-
sent legislation, and patient challenges to physician authority generally).
70. The Florida statute, for example, allows for either oral communication or a written
summary to satisfy its informed consent requirement. FLA. STAT. § 459.0125 (2007).
71. Nayfield, supra note 5, at 1205.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1204.
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provide that a physician who fails to distribute the standardized litera-
ture may have his or her license revoked, suspended, or limited as a
result.75 This may add even more stress onto the physician-patient rela-
tionship, which is already affected by the specter of legal threats.76 Thus
many characteristics of the statutes and the resulting literature may be
counterproductive for patients. The fact of such variations exist is, in
itself, a potentially troubling aspect because it means that women in cer-
tain states may be getting out-dated or otherwise inferior information.
In addition to the variations, many of the statutes may actually dis-
empower patients. For example, some of the literature dictates
"mandatory autonomy" for the patient. This is the message that a pa-
tient must, not should, make the treatment decision independently.
77
Hawaii's brochure, which came out if its breast cancer informed consent
statute, states that breast cancer patients "must be well-informed and
involved in the decision-making," telling patients: "[i]t is your body and
you have the most to gain or lose by how it is treated,"78 which may be a
directive not well-received by all patients because not all patients want
to feel in charge of their own course of treatment." A more direct exam-
ple of the disempowering nature of the statutes are provisions that limit
future actions against physicians. Michigan and Maine ban patients
from bringing civil informed consent suits against their doctors once
they have indicated receipt of the breast cancer treatment literature. ° So,
in both subtle and obvious ways, many of these laws are crafted in such
a way that patients may lose more than they gain by their existence.
B. The Modern Landscape of Breast Cancer & Informed Consent
These statutes attempt to ameliorate a problem invented by the
law-that is, a shortage of facts leading to overuse of mastectomy-with
a solution that corresponds to the legal invention. The purported goal of
informed consent is to help individual patients make more self-satisfying
decisions. These informed consent statutes have not had a significant
effect on patients' treatment choices.8 Part III.B will focus on research
75. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2836 (2002); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 14-404 (Lex-
isNexis 2005).
76. SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 31.
77. Schneider, supra note 55, at 413
78. Nayfield, supra note 5, at *3.
79. SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 114-15.
80. MICH. COMP. LAws § 333.17513 (2001); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. TIT. 24, § 2905-A
(2000).
81. Nattinger, supra note 6, at 5430.
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on patients and physicians in light of the nature of these statutes, argu-
ing that these laws do not promote, and indeed may impede, treatment
decisions that are satisfying for patients because the laws are divorced
from reality. 2
Paradoxically, by creating an informed consent "plus" standard for
breast cancer patients, these statutes push past the goal of the right deci-
sion for the individual and toward a pre-conceived "right" answer,
period. These statutes are responsible for patient reference documents
that are stuck in a moment in history; this array of literature is not only
questionable in its variability, but moreover because it does not-and
cannot-adjust with the ever-changing socio-medico climate.
Although most conscientious physicians are certainly concerned
about communication problems with patients, if for no other reason
than the potential legal liability of such deficiencies, physicians are not
necessarily optimistic about prescriptive legal attempts to intervene in
their patient relationships. Physician authors have noted "[t]hese [breast
cancer] laws are of particular interest to medical practice because they
prescriptively mandate physician behavior within the patient-physician
relationship and potentially define the medical information upon which
treatment decisions are based."83 Thus, while physicians may be well
aware of still-existing problems in communicating with their patients,
they are understandably wary of the law's ability to improve things by
usurping the doctor's role at its most critical moment: cancer diagnosis
and treatment. This attitude may partially represent a vestige of medical
paternalism, but to write it off as nothing more than paternalism would
be foolish. After all, doctors are experts on medical issues. Therefore,
when an unrelated institution such as law comes in with medical infor-
81
mation, it is troublesome from a common sense perspective.
Whatever its faults, the medical system does not make a practice of
implementing a procedure without first studying its effects on patients.
Several medical doctors published a paper reviewing the content of the
then eighteen breast cancer informed consent statutes, looking at the
82. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at xv. Prof. Schneider calls this phenomenon "hyper-
rationalism," which he defines as "essentially the substitution of reason for informa-
tion and analysis." Id.
83. Nayfield, supra note 5, at 1202.
84. It is interesting and relevant to note that the ABA Model Rules of Professional Re-
sponsibility do not require lauyers to inform their clients of technical legal details in
order to obtain proper informed consent. The rules state that a lawyer must give the
client "sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning the
objectives of the representation and the means by which they are to be pursued," but
a lawyer need not "ordinarily ... be expected to describe trial or negotiation strategy
in detail." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 cmt. 5 (2007).
[Vol. 14:201
BREAST CANCER INFORMED CONSENT STATUTES
informational content required by each, and what each requires of phy-
sicians." They wrote that "[t]hese statutes represent an unusual policy
response in that they address the patient-physician relationship in the
context of a particular disease [whose] impact on the process and out-
comes of breast cancer care [had] not been undertaken" at the time of
enactment."86 That is, doctors criticized the laws for interceding in the
medical realm without first gathering empirical evidence that such ac-
tions would be good for patients.
Though chauvinistic attitudes and unequal, disrespectful treatment
of breast cancer patients by doctors has been well documented, 87 it is
misleading and unhelpful to conflate the past with the present. As dis-
cussed in Part II, physicians' statements during the era of the radical
mastectomy demonstrate their vast misunderstanding of the role of gen-
der in breast cancer treatment. Professor Theresa Montini, a scholar of
women's health policy issues, compiled research on the public debate
surrounding breast cancer informed consent statutes in the 1980s.
8
Montini asserts that physicians opposed the legislation because it would
impede their decisional authority, and that their means of attacking the
utility of the statutes centered around the medical consensus that the
"hyper-emotionality" of women contaminated the breast cancer treat-
ment decision-making process.89 While this criticism should not be
ignored, it is important to distinguish popular medical opinion from the
1970s with opinions more prevalent today, which have changed radi-
cally in the past several decades. 90
Physician attitudes have changed drastically in the past decade.
Surgeons were criticized for their slow adoption of BCS in favor of mas-
tectomy in the past.9' Breast cancer patients who advocated for breast
cancer informed consent legislation in the 1970s criticized surgeons for
railroading them into having mastectomies and not fully informing
them of less invasive BCS. 92 By contrast, a 2005 study of breast cancer
treatment outcomes found, through patient interviews, that when pa-
tients reported that they did perceive their surgeon's recommendation of
BCS over mastectomy, they more often interpreted the surgeon to be
85. Nayfield, supra note 5, at 1202.
86. Id. at 1207.
87. See, e.g., Montini, supra note 17, at 9, 19.
88. Montini, supra note 17, at 9.
89. Id. at 19.
90. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 4-5 (summarizing several recent studies that demon-
strate the changes in doctors' attitudes toward patient autonomy).
91. Nattinger, supra note 6, at 5429.
92. Montini, supra note 17, at 13-16.
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endorsing BCS.93 Female surgeons in particular are less likely than male
surgeons to believe that BCS is related to a better quality of life progno-
sis than mastectomy according to the same study.94 This view is
consistent with the results from multiple studies that have measured
quality of life after BCS versus mastectomy."
This is not to say that physician-patient communication about
breast cancer treatment has no room for improvement. But an imperfect
communication process is not ground for such specific legal measures
like the informed consent statutes, especially where the legal prescription
is based on assumptions about women and breast cancer instead of re-
search on what exactly is failing between doctors and their breast cancer
patients.
In fact, it is now patients, not surgeons, who are responsible for
mastectomy's continued popularity. The 2005 Katz study found that
"[g]reater patient involvement in [breast cancer patient] decision- mak-
ing was associated with greater use of mastectomy rather than greater
use of BCS."96 These findings are contrary to the general assumption
that surgeons are holding back the popularity of BCS-the general as-
sumption that breast cancer informed consent statutes are based on.
Take former anchorwoman Rene Syler.97 After being diagnosed with
atypical ductal hyperplasia, and being informed that this condition
would significantly increase her chances of getting breast cancer, she
eventually decided to get a prophylactic double mastectomy in order to
alleviate her fears over getting cancer in the future.98 Her decision was
influenced by the fear she felt, caused not only by the diagnosis but also
by both her mother and father's bouts with breast cancer.99 In the end,
she was satisfied.' 00 Syler's story goes to the law's misunderstanding of
breast cancer patient decision-making, suggesting at best that the litera-
ture does not affect the decision-making of breast cancer patients, and at
worst that the literature is pushing a view on women who, as individu-
als, are inclined to choose mastectomy.
While all wrongs have not yet been righted, the favorable trend that
has brought about a physician-patient relationship marked by far better
communication, and much greater respect for individual dignity and
93. Nattinger, supra note 6, at 5429.
94. Steven J. Katz et al., Surgeon Perspectives about Local Therapy for Breast Carcinoma,
104 CANCER 1854, 1858 (2005).
95. Id. at 1858-59.
96. Nattinger, supra note 6, at 5429 (citing Katz et al., supra note 94, at 5526)
97. Rene Syler, DefendingMy Life, 0, OPRAH MAG., April 2007, at 149, 149-150.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 150-51.
100. Id. at 152.
[Vol. 14:201
BREAST CANCER INFORMED CONSENT STATUTES
preference should be studied and emulated. Though many statements
made by physicians in response to the passage of breast cancer informed
consent statutes are appalling, their shock value does not mean that they
should dictate today's policy making. To ignore the significant positive
changes that have occurred is detrimental for all patients. There is no
sense in creating informed consent statutes rooted in bygone nightmares
about authority-hungry physicians. As Carl Schneider writes about the
failure of informed consent in general: "If the past worshiped false gods
and the present's gods have failed, where do we turn? Perhaps we need a
skeptical reconsideration of informed consent.,,10
The usefulness of the statutes may be largely outmoded due to
positive evolutions in both gender equality and in the physician-patient
relationship. A 2005 study of breast cancer patients found that most
patients, from a sample of women diagnosed in 2002, were satisfied
with both their ultimate treatment choice and the decision-making
process. 102 While the authors of this study did not speculate as to why, in
general, the rates were so positive, it may be largely a factor of time. As
discussed in Part II of this Article, breast cancer's history during the
twentieth century was dynamic, marked with greater patient participa-
tion and increased awareness and sensitivity on the part of the medical
profession. This trend seems to be continuing into the twenty-first cen-
tury.
Though physician-patient interactions have improved dramatically
during the time that many of the statutes have been on the books, these
statutes are not a driving force for this change. Studies found that
women living in states with legislation mandating that breast cancer pa-
tients receive information on treatment options were, nonetheless, "not
fully aware of important differences between the procedures."'0'3 Litera-
ture in the form of pamphlets, brochures, and the like has been of very
questionable efficacy or utility.' 4
In fact, the very premise of breast cancer informed consent statutes
is not justified by research on actual breast cancer patients. The idea that
informed breast cancer patients will choose BCS over mastectomy is
101. Schneider, supra note 4, at 91.
102. Lantz et. al., supra note 7, at 745.
103. Steven J. Katz, Paula M. Lantz & Judith K. Zemencuk, Correlates of Surgical Treat-
ment Type for Women with Noninvasive and Invasive Breast Cancer, 10 J. WOMEN'S
HEALTH & GENDER-BASED MED. 659, 667 (2001).
104. Nayfield, supra note 5, at 1207. In a study of important sources of medical informa-
tion to women, "[i]mportant sources of information ... were predominately 'people'
sources" while "[c]linic handouts were rated among the three most important sources
by only 36% of patients." Id.
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105 106
wrong. Fear of recurrence, concerns about the side effects of radia-
tion therapy, 10 7 and anecdotal reasoning lo' are among the factors that
may lead a woman to ultimately choose mastectomy over BCS. Con-
cerns about physical appearance, or, perhaps, the belief that the removal
of a breast equates to sacrificing a fulfilling physical appearance are less
significant to breast cancer treatment decision-making than lawmakers
seem to have assumed.'0° The current paradigm of informed consent in
the law, which is exemplified by the breast cancer informed consent
statutes, does not sufficiently account for these female-centered deci-
sion-making factors.
While the National Institute of Health (NIH) Consensus Devel-
opment Conference issued a statement in 1990 coming out in favor of
BCS over mastectomy, it has not been shown that BCS results in supe-
rior psychosocial outcomes for breast cancer patients."0 What has been
found, on the other hand, is that as a patient's level of involvement in
decision-making increased, her chance of choosing mastectomy in-
creased."' Or, stated conversely, a more involved patient is significantly
less likely to elect BCS.
l 2
There are salient differences among women that this cookie-cutter
legislation does not address as well. For example, women who elected to
have a mastectomy were less likely to report concerns about body image
as important factors in their surgical treatment decision. 113 Also, ethnic
minorities and women with low incomes were more likely to have low
satisfaction with the decision-making process."' The problems that re-
main in the physician-patient relationship with respect to breast cancer
treatment are simply not going to be alleviated by a pamphlet.
105. Nattinger, supra note 6, at 5430.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Ann B. Nattinger et al., Effect of Nancy Reagan's Mastectomy on Choice of Surgery for
Breast Cancer by U.S. Women, 279 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 762 (1998).
109. Katz, supra note 103, at 665.
110. Nayfield, supra note 5, at 1205 (citing Nat'l Insts. Health Consensus Dev. Confer-
ence Statement, Treatment of Early-Stage Breast Cancer Consensus Statement (July
21, 1990) (on file with author)).
111. Lantz et. al., supra note 14, at 753.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 761.
114. Id. at 760.
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C. Medical Decision-Making & Breast Cancer Patients
There are problems that need solutions when it comes to women
and medicine. But these solutions need to be conceived of as concerns
for women, not merely a bait and switch wherein patriarchal laws pur-
port to fix undue paternalism in medicine. There is still work to be
done, and with medical technology always advancing, so too must pa-
tient awareness advance. What issues should be given greater
consideration for breast cancer patients facing treatment options?
Breast cancer is a socially, historically, and medically complex dis-
ease. The breast itself is not merely an anatomical structure. It is a rich
and often contradictory symbol. It represents motherhood and nour-
ishment, as well as eroticism and sexuality."' 5 Accordingly, cancer of the
breast, and its meanings for those afflicted and for society at large, is
complicated as well. Breast cancer invokes the fear of disfigurement, the
social construct of the female body, and the importance of a female sex-
ual organ, among many other issues." 6 This does not make breast cancer
patients a unique group insofar as how they make decisions-no group
generalizations can be made in medical decision-making, and this is the
root of these laws' failure. However, that is not to say that breast cancer
patients are not affected by factors specific to the disease.
Involving patients in the decision-making process is not a clear-cut
way to ensure a satisfied patient; patients prefer to be involved in differ-
ent ways and to differing degrees. Women who were satisfied with their
involvement in breast cancer treatment decision-making did not neces-
sarily participate to the fullest extent possible; what was more important
for patient satisfaction was that a patient participated to the degree she
preferred. Patients whose decision involvement preference-that is, a
preference of high involvement versus a preference to have one's surgeon
dominate the decision-making-matched what occurred were much
more likely to report satisfaction regarding the treatment decision-
making process than others."7 Dissatisfaction resulted not only from a
lack of decision-making power, but also from being forced to take a
more active role in deciding on a treatment."'
115. Paula M. Lantz & Karen M. Booth, The Social Construction of the Epidemic of Breast
Cancer, 46 Soc. Sci. MED. 907, 910-11 (1998).
116. See LERNER, supra note 5, at 194 (saying that there existed "more than one femi-
nism," discussing how breast cancer exemplified the varying values among women).
117. Lantz et. al., supra note 14, at 762 (finding that of the women sampled who reported
negative satisfaction outcome, about 30% reported that they had more participation
in deciding on a treatment than they wanted).
118. Id.
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Research shows that a patient's decision to undergo mastectomy in-
stead of BCS will be influenced by the preference for action when facing
cancer. Cancer patients as a non-gender-specific group have been stud-
ied in terms of their decision-making process. Fagerlin and others
conducted a study in which they "assessed the proportion of people who
would choose nonoptimal treatments ... when presented with hypo-
thetical scenarios describing the need to cure already existent cancers......
They reported that respondents' "desire to take action was even stronger
when the hypothetical treatment described was a surgical intervention,"
as opposed to watchful waiting, in spite of the fact that such surgical
options actually increase mortality rate and lead to earlier mortality as
well. 120 The study found that "[t] o some people, this early mortality was
preferable to a slower death from cancer.,,121
These statutes are a shining example of laws disconnect with the
reality of breast cancer patients. Moreover, these laws fly in the face of
the purported goals of informed consent by actually assuming that
meaningful decision-making means making a decision in a manner
which is inconsistent with how cancer patients, and women in particu-
lar, actually make decisions. These laws presume that "good" decision-
making in the breast cancer context will manifest by more women
choosing BCS, or lumpectomy. This goal is clearly problematic: it is
based on wrong-headed assumptions about women's preferences, out-
dated surgeon views on BCS and mastectomy, and statutory means that
have nothing to do with the sources of communication problems be-
tween patients and physicians.
When it comes to improving physician-patient relationships in the
realm of breast cancer treatment, we need to go back to basics. What are
women unhappy about? They are not crying out to in effect become
their own doctors, weighing all available data and then telling their doc-
tors what to do. What they want is to be listened to, communicated
with, and above all respected. These wants are not unique to women,
but are certainly complicated and often amplified because of gender
roles.
Can the law accomplish what needs to be done for patients and
physicians? Perhaps not, at least not directly. Legal reform could be used
to encourage the type of grass-roots movements that got women talking
to each other about breast cancer during the era of the radical mastec-
119. Angela Fagerlin, Brian J. Zikmund-Fisher & Peter A. Ubel, Cure Me Even If It Kills
Me: Preferences for Invasive Cancer Treatment, 25 MED. DECISION MAKING 614, 615
(2005).
120. Id. at 618.
121. Id.
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tomy 22 through funding or public education. Governmental organiza-
tions such as the National Institute of Health could encourage research
on patient decision-making, the likes of which have been cited herein.
Patient activism and evolution in medicine work, whereas laws like these
do not. And if the efforts of these breast cancer informed consent stat-
utes are fruitless, then the costs and energies that go into them should
stop being wasted.
CONCLUSION
Informed consent statutes may have been advocated for by breast
cancer patients, but they do not conform to women's needs. Recall that
Montini's interview with breast cancer advocates who were involved in
lobbying for such legislation in the early 1980s reported that their dis-
satisfaction stemmed from an emotional disconnect from doctors,123 not
from a lack of available statistics, or a hard copy of the relevant topics to
consider.
There are gender-specific issues in the medical realm that have
driven patient rights reformers to push for legal changes aimed at
women. Physicians still invoke gender stereotypes with female patients,
which in turn adversely affects the relationship.1 2 1 On average, women
have been found to have worse relationships with their doctors than125ha
men. Medicine has been slow to abandon its male-centered paradigm.
For example, until the 1990s, the Federal Drug Administration man-
dated that females be precluded from participation in clinical trials for
prescription drugs.2 2 The NIH did not adopt guidelines requiring the
inclusion of women in research until the 1990s. 127 While the need for
change was clear, these laws do not help breast cancer patients.
The statutes are not justifiable under informed consent's original
goals. Though appealing in theory, informed consent is often ineffective
and at times counterproductive in actual medical settings. We ought to
122. See supra Part I for a detailed discussion of the role of breast cancer survivors in the
debate surrounding the radical mastectomy.
123. Montini, supra note 17, at 13-14.
124. Lisa Napoli, The Doctrine of Informed Consent and Women: The Achievment of Equal
Value and Equal Exercise on Autonomy, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & LAw 335,
336-7 (1996); see also Nancy K. Kubasek, Legislative Approaches to Reducing the He-
gemony of the Priestly Model of Medicine, 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 375 (1997) ("[T]he
legal culture ... undergirds the priestly [model of medicine's] hegemony over the
therapeutic relationship between a woman and her doctor.")
125. Napoli, supra note 124, at 336.
126. MacDougall, supra note 22, at 809-10.
127. Id.
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be concerned about this legislation in terms of its ministerial costs, in-
creased strain on the physician-patient relationship, and lack of efficacy
in terms of decision-making habits of breast cancer patients. While laws
embody the moral will of a society,12 laws driven by baseless assump-
tions about women's decision-making are not furthering society's goals.
These laws ought not be pursued, certainly not in the name of informed
consent.
If what we want is to help women make a decision that they are
content with when faced with breast cancer, then we must abandon
these statutes. Trading one paternalism for another will not help matters;
especially not a paternalism that disregards scientific data about deci-
sion-making and exists outside the realm of medical treatment.
Improving the physician-patient relationship is an important societal
goal, but legally required pamphlets and the like are not helping women
or doctors toward this end. t
128. See Scott, supra note 3.
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